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Learning: A Processural Outcome of Human Activity 
 
ChangGook Youn and Ian Baptiste 
Pennsylvania State University, USA 
 
Abstract: Via a critical appropriation of ideas from cultural historical activity 
theory (CHAT), this paper addresses three shortcomings in adult learning 
theories: insufficient guidance regarding how to systematically analyze learning 
that occurs in everyday life; 2) absence of mechanisms for overcoming subject-
object dualism; and 3) insufficient analytic consideration for collective subjects. 
 
Introduction 
Although dominant theories of adult learning (such as self-directed or transformative 
learning) make general claims about how adults learn, the authors of this paper find in them little 
guidance regarding how to systematically observe and analyze learning that occurs in the 
everydayness of life. Moreover, theories of adult learning are beleaguered by a subject-object 
dualism that continues to plague classical behaviorist and cognitivist learning theories 
(Engeström, 1999; Vygotsky, 1978). In most adult learning theories, the subject and object of 
learning remain conceptually (and often physically) separated from each other; with no adequate 
mechanism provided for their interaction. Dewey’s (1938) two principles of experience 
(continuity and interaction) were proposed, in part, to overcome the problem. But Dewey did not 
articulate a mechanism by which these two principles operate. Another concern of ours is how to 
examine learning that is produced and enacted by a collective subject. Adult learning theories do 
not deny that collectives can and do learn; but in most theories the focus is on individual 
learning. Even when collective subjects are emphasized (as is the case, for instance, with 
organization learning or discourse on the learning organization) a mechanism for empirically 
observing and analyzing the learning of collective subjects is not articulated. This paper 
addresses the concerns raised above by critically appropriating ideas from CHAT. We do not 
present an overview or critique of CHAT. Rather, within our space constraint, we discuss 
selected ideas we believe best address our concerns. They are: 1) mediation and mediating 
artifacts; 2) collective subjects and the hierarchical structure of activity; 3) activity systems; 4) 
relationship between learning and activity; and 5) multi-voicedness and contradictions 
(Engeström, 1987; Leont'ev, 1978; Vygotsky, 1978).  
 
Mediation and Mediating Artifacts 
Most learning theories assume that a subject and an object must interact in some way to 
produce learning; however, a direct relationship is often presumed. Behaviorists, for instance, 
presume that the subject is directly controlled by the operations of the object, while cognitivists 
presume that the meaning of the object is under direct control of the subject. Employing Marxist 
historical materialism, Vygotsky (1978) has introduced a third element—mediating artifacts—to 
overcome the subject-object dualism. Mediating artifacts are tools and signs (instruments). Tools 
are externally oriented means by which humans master and triumph over nature; we use them to 
change our external environment. On the other hand, we use signs to regulate our behavior; they 
are means of internal activity aimed at mastering ourselves. For Vygotsky, not only are subjects 
and objects always connected via mediating artifacts; they are also always co-constituted through 
this process of mediation. In mediation humans are rendered both producers and products of their 
environments. Mediating artifacts not only provide a way to empirically connect subject and 
object; in mediation, the dynamics of the relationship between and among subject and object is 
also revealed. The idea of mediation also enables us to approach learning from a historical and 
cultural perspective—signs and tools are cumulative products of our history and culture 
(Engeström, 1987; Sawchuk, 2003). 
 
Collective Subjects and the Hierarchical Structure of Activity 
By distinguishing between individual action and collective activity, Leont’ev (1978, 
1981) has extended Vygotsky’s ideas to include collective subjects. Using the primeval hunt as 
an example of a collective activity, Leont’ev argues that, as a member of a hunting party, a bush 
beater’s actions are rendered meaningful only when considered as part of a collective effort. 
With this example, Leont’ev demonstrates that an individual’s action does not necessarily meet 
the objective of a collective activity. To further articulate his views, Leont’ev differentiates 
among three levels of human activeness—operations, actions, and activities—based on what 
directs each (Leont’ev, 1978). Operations, the most concrete level, are directed by prevailing 
conditions; actions, the intermediary level, are directed by goals; and activities, the most abstract 
level, are directed by motives. Operations are particular ways of performing a task—e.g., 
particular ways of peddling a bike, or memorizing an algebraic equation. Because individuals 
possess different levels of expertise, power, and resources, they usually perform the “same” task 
quite differently. Actions are a set of operations that are coordinated to achieve a particular goal. 
The authors of this paper distinguish between goals and motives. Motives are biologically-
induced, culturally-mediated drives, desires, interests, etc., such as sex, recreation, entertainment, 
mobility, physical safety, economic security, dignity, and so on. Goals, on the other hand, are 
intermediary objectives, undertaken to satisfy one or more motives. Compared to goals, motives 
are more basic, more fundamental, more abstract, and more universal. For instance, drinking 
water and riding a bike may be regarded as goals, not motives; no one has a basic desire to drink 
water or ride a bike. Each of these intermediary objectives is undertaken to satisfy a more basic 
(biologically-induced) desire, such as thirst or recreation, respectively. A goal may also satisfy 
another goal which in turn may satisfy a motive. For instance, a 17 year old boy rakes leaves (a 
goal) to obtain money (another goal) to purchase an iPod (another goal) to satisfy his need for 
entertainment (a motive). The teenager may use his iPod, not only for his entertainment, but also 
to score points with the girls (another motive). 
Two criteria differentiate a human activity from more concrete human behaviors: motive 
and collective effort. Motives were defined in the preceding paragraph. A collective effort 
involves a community (or communities) of practice operating under particular rules and divisions 
of labor. Rules are incomplete guides to action; they “specify how decisions should be made and 
how work processes are to be performed” (Hatch, 1997, p. 166). Rules may be formal or 
informal, and may be upheld by coercion (which includes social sanctions) or by ones’ own 
internalized values (norms). Divisions of labor reflect the distribution or assignment of 
responsibilities among various actors. A community of practice is not merely a community of 
people with the same kind of interest, such as watching movies or fishing, but of people who 
share a repertoire of resources, such as experiences, stories, tools, ways of addressing recurring 
problems, etc., etc. In short, a community of practice refers to a group of people who have 
interacted over time on particular sets of objects (Lave & Wenger, 1991). The three levels of 
human activeness just described build on each other, with the more abstract being dependent on 
the less. Actions are accomplished only through operations, and activities are accomplished only 
through actions. With practice and internalization, activities often collapse into mere actions and 




To foster systematic examination of human activities, Engeström (1987) has extended the 
ideas discussed above into an activity system depicted in Figure 1, below. The system consists of 
seven components (subject, instruments, objects, rules, communities of practice, divisions of 
labor, and outcomes) arranged as one large triangle with four sub-triangles embedded. The sub-
triangles represent higher order functions that arise from mutual relations among the seven 
components (Holt & Morris, 1993; Nardi, 1998). Each sub-triangle represents an aspect of 
human activity: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. 
Production creates the objects which correspond to the given needs; distribution divides 
them up according to social laws; exchange… parcels out the already divided shares in 
accord with individual needs; and finally, in consumption, the product steps outside this 
social movement and becomes a direct object and servant of individual need, and satisfies 
it in being consumed. Thus production appears to be the point of departure, consumption 
as the conclusion, distribution and exchange as the middle... (Engeström, 1987, p. 78, 
cited in Marx 1973, p. 89). 
The top sub-triangle in Engeström’s model was originally created by Vygotsky to 
emphasize the mediating role of tools and signs. It consists of three components: subject, 
instruments, and object. Subject refers to either an individual or aggregate of individuals seeking 
to achieve goals or motives through action or activity. Instruments are tools and signs: means 
through which particular actions are carried out. They include both abstract and physical artifacts 
such as language, theories, computers, and houses. Instruments mediate the subject’s actions 
toward the object. Objects are modifiable ends toward which activities are directed, and from 
which outcomes are expected. Objects may be material (e.g., a piece of wood in the hands of a 
sculptor) or non-material (e.g., a research problem on the mind of a research investigator). 
Objects give shape and direction to human activity and help to distinguish one activity from 
another. Rules, community of practice, and division of labor (defined earlier) make up the base 
of Engeström’s activity system. Together with instruments, they represent the cultural and 
historical contexts in which particular activities are enacted. There seems to be, in Engeström’s 
formulation, a blurring of the lines between rules, community of practice, and division of labor. 
Rules, for instance, are a necessary ingredient in defining divisions of labor; and both rules and 
divisions of labor are products of a community of practice. Furthermore, Engeström’s physical 
separation of the four functions (into four separate sub-triangles) seems to run contrary to his 
own interpretation of Marx. On this matter Engeström writes: 
Marx goes on to show that things are not so simple…. Production is always also 
consumption of the individual's abilities and of the means of production. 
Correspondingly, consumption is also production of the human beings themselves. 
Furthermore, distribution seems to be not just a consequence of production but also its 
immanent prerequisite in the form of distribution of instruments of production and 
distribution of members of the society among the different kinds of production. Finally, 
exchange, too, is found inside production, in the form of communication, interaction and 
exchange of unfinished products between the producers (Engeström, 1987, p. 79).  
Engeström’s physical separation of the four functions obscures their co-constitutive 
character; and his explanation for maintaining that separation does not convince us. Moreover, 
we fail to see how this physical separation aids our analysis of learning. With Marx, we therefore 
emphasize the ‘organic wholeness’ and ‘mutual interaction of the four moments’, over their 
physical separation (Marx, 1973, 99ff). 
 
Figure 1: The structure of human activity system (Source: Engeström, 1987, p. 78)  
 
Relationship between Learning and Activity 
Outcomes, the seventh and last element in Engeström’s activity system, are the intended 
and unintended results of the collective effort. They include material objects, such as new and/or 
improved equipment as well as non-material objects such as new knowledge and skills. Learning 
(those relatively stable changes in behavioral potential that are made manifest through generation 
of new knowledge and skills) is one possible outcome of human activity. Learning may then be 
defined as procesural outcomes of human activities. Procesural harkens back to knowledge and 
skills. Dewey’s assertion that “knowing is something that we do” (1916, p. 331) breaks down the 
categorical distinction between knowledge and skills, knowing and doing. Indeed, skills are a 
specific kind of knowledge; skills are more obviously procesural—i.e., it is obvious that skills 
involve a set of coordinated operations. In arguing that knowledge is “shared procedures” 
Toulmin (1999) reminds us, however, that all knowledge is also procesural. To say that I have 
this or that knowledge, is to assert that I am able, in some small or great way, to communicate 
(with myself or another) a set of procedures about how to do something. It is the communicative 
(shared) aspect of the exercise that makes it knowledge. My knowledge is a measure of how well 
I am able to communicate those procedures. In CHAT those procedures are called operations. 
Learning then are procesural outcomes of human activities that take the form of new and/or 
improved human operations.  
With proponents of CHAT we maintain that not all human activities result in learning. 
This assertion implies a crucial distinction between learning and activity: activities are a means 
and learning is one possible end. Consider, for instance, a form of learning, L1, derived from an 
activity, A1. Now L1 may be used in a subsequent activity (A2) to facilitate new forms of 
learning, L2, L3, L4, and so on. But L1 cannot bring about itself; for to do so is to collapse means 
and ends. There is an even more compelling reason for distinguishing between learning and 
activity. To qualify as a human activity, the behavior must not only be a collective effort; it must 
also be directed by one or more specific motives. There are no specific motives associated with 
the general term, learning. The authors of this paper are yet to meet anyone who is interested in 
learning in an ontological vacuum. People are always interested in learning something. It is this 
something (the motive) that gives definition and impetus to the activity. That activity, in turn, is 
properly identified, not by its outcomes (of which learning is one possibility) but by its 
motive(s). For instance, the act of reading or grocery shopping signifies an activity; and although 
learning may be an intended or unintended outcome, the exact nature of either activity is made 
apparent only when their motives are revealed. So the activities (for which reading and grocery 
shopping are actions) are best defined and identified, not by what is learned, but by their 
motives. In contenting that learning is not an activity we break ranks with proponents of CHAT 
(such as Engeström, 1987) who regard it (at least expansive learning) as a special kind of 
activity. A major research implication for our assertion that learning is not an activity is this: to 
empirically examine learning we do not search for any special learning process(es). Instead, we 
simply analyze everyday human activities and ask: what new and/or improved repertoire of 
operations has this or that activity generated. Those new human operations are what we call 
learning. 
 
Multi-voicedness and Contradictions 
We know of colleagues who have criticized Engeström’s activity system for its presumed 
inattention to the complexity of subjects. The concern is that, in Engeström’s subjects, issues of 
identify, individual differences, and diversity are not directly addressed. We believe that 
Engeström’s notions of multi-voicedness and contradictions address well this criticism. 
According to Engeström (1991), an activity system cannot but have multiple viewpoints, 
cultures, traditions, and interests because division of labor creates different perspectives and 
participants create their own history. This multi-voicedness (augmented and amplified in 
networks of relations among activity systems) is always a source of trouble, conflict, 
improvement, negotiation, and change. 
Engeström employs the term contradictions to explain how system change occurs. He 
argues that the force of system change arises from four levels of contradictions. Level 1 
designates contradictions within components of the activity under consideration, e.g., 
contradictions within subjects, instruments, or rules (intra-component contradictions). Level 2 
contradictions emerge from relationships between components, e.g., contradictions between 
subjects and community of practice (inter-component contradictions). Tertiary contradictions 
(level 3) emerge when representatives of culture introduce objects and motives of culturally 
more advanced forms of activities into existing activity systems, while quaternary contradictions 
(level 4) arise from tensions between the activity under consideration and its neighboring 
activities. Neighboring activities are not necessarily interdependent, but their subjects, 
instruments, and outcomes often come into physical contact—making cultural exchange 
inevitable. Tertiary and quaternary contradictions seem to provide the key to understanding 
radical innovation and change, i.e., changes involving the development of more culturally 
advanced forms of activities. Engeström argues that in tertiary and quaternary contradictions are 
found new instruments that function as ‘springboards’ for breaking the constraints of the double 




We have critically appropriated Engeström’s (1987) activity system as a framework for 
analyzing learning that occurs in the everydayness of life. The framework takes as a starting 
point that human activities are the primary vehicles through which learning is fostered and 
impeded. Any serious empirical investigation of learning therefore necessitates systematic 
examination of human activities, as a primary unit of analysis. Governed, however, by motives 
that are often hidden from view, activities are not always plainly evident. Accordingly, our 
analysis often begins by examining goal-directed actions and the operations that constitute them. 
While our analysis of particular actions directs our attention to particular goals, examination of 
particular operations leads us to consider the unique conditions that give rise to particular 
operational expressions. Considered too, are particular composition and arrangement of 
instruments used in the execution of the activity, as well as particular characteristics of subjects 
involved (both collectives and individuals). Motives surface as our analysis proceeds, and their 
identification allows us not only to observe contradictions within and among activity systems. 
Identification of motives also helps us better understand the cultural-historical contexts in which 
particular activities are enacted. Communities of practice that advance particular motives come 
into view; and, with their discovery, complementary and competing rules, and divisions of labor, 
surface. With such analysis, learning (understood not as an activity or some special process, but 
as procesural outcomes of everyday activities) is relatively easy to detect, because they surface 
as new and/or improved forms of human operation. 
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